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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COMMERCE CLAUSE-REGUITION BY
CONGRESS-The United States Supreme Court held that the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded Congress' power
under the Commerce Clause because the Act sought to regulate
a non-economic, intrastate activity.
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
Alfonso Lopez ("Lopez") was a twelfth grade student at Edison
High School in San Antonio, Texas, when, on March 10, 1992, he
carried a concealed weapon onto school grounds.1 An anonymous
source reported to school officials that Lopez had in his
possession a .38 caliber handgun and five bullets.2 School
officials subsequently questioned Lopez, who admitted that he
had in his possession the handgun and bullets.' Local
authorities arrested Lopez and charged him with violating a
state law which prohibited possession of firearms on school
property.4 The State dismissed the charges the following day.5
Federal officials then charged Lopez with violating the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 (the "Act").' The Act made possession
of a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school a federal offense.'
A federal grand jury indicted Lopez for violating § 922(q) of
the Act.' Lopez sought to have the indictment dismissed based
on the theory that it was outside Congress' power to regulate
1. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995).
2. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
3. Id.
4. Id. The Texas law made it a felony to enter the grounds of a school or
any educational institution with a firearm. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.03(a)(1)
(Supp. 1994).
5. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
6. Id. The Act included findings that crime was a nationwide problem exacer-
bated by the interstate movement of firearms; firearms have been found in in-
creasing numbers in schools; and school authorities have had a difficult time in
trying to cope with an increase in gun possession. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A-I) (1990 &
Supp. V 1993). Therefore, Congress made it a crime for an individual to possess a
firearm at a place that the individual knows or has reason to know is a school zone.
18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A)-(I), (2)(A) (1990 & Supp. V 1993).
7. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626. "The term 'school' means a school which pro-
vides elementary or secondary education, as determined under State law." 18 U.S.C.
§ 921(a)(25XA), (a)(26).
8. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
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conduct in public schools.' The district court dismissed Lopez'
motion, holding that Congress acted within its power under the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution when it
enacted § 922(q) of the Act.'0 The district court ultimately
found Lopez guilty of violating the Act and sentenced him to six
months in prison and two years probation. 1 On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded
that Congress overstepped its authority under the Commerce
Clause in enacting the Act. 2 The United States appealed the
decision and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari."3 The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
Fifth Circuit."'
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, cited two
reasons why Congress, in passing the Act, exceeded its authority
under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. 5 First, in
enacting § 922(q) of the Act, Congress sought to regulate a non-
commercial intrastate activity reserved to the states."s Second,
the Act did not contain a requirement that the activity regulated
by § 922(q) have a nexus to interstate commerce."' In justifying
its arrival at this conclusion, the majority stressed the
importance of the two-tiered system of government created by
the United States Constitution."8 Citing the Federalist, a recent
Supreme Court decision on the matter and the Constitution, the
Court emphasized that the balance of power between states and
the federal government must be maintained in order to assure
that neither government could encroach upon the freedom of its
citizens. 9
9. Id.
10. Id. The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to "regulate com-
merce . . . with foreign nations, among the States and with Indian Tribes." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The interpretation of the Clause allows Congress to reach
intrastate, i.e., local activity which has a substantial impact on interstate commerce.
See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
11. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
12. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1993), aff'd, 115 S.
Ct. 1624 (1995).
13. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
14. Id. The vote was 5-4, with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas for the majority; and, Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer
and Ginsburg dissented. Id. at 1625.
15. Id. at 1630-31.
16. Id. at 1632.
17. Id. at 1631.
18. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
19. Id. The majority cited: THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison), U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, which enumerates the explicit powers of Congress and Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). "[A] healthy balance of power between the States and
the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either
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With the constitutionally mandated concept of federalism
drawn as its base, the Court then analyzed over 150 years of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence to define the limits of the power
of Congress to regulate intrastate activity under the guise of the
Commerce Clause. 0 Nearly all of the decisions cited by the
Court as establishing these limits upheld various regulations
enacted by Congress to regulate intrastate activity.2' The Court
pointed out, however, that even these decisions, which expanded
the regulatory authority of Congress under the Commerce
Clause, recognized a limit to that power.2
The Court then identified three areas of intrastate activity
that Congress, under its commerce clause power, has the
authority to regulate.23 The first area is the regulation of the
channels of interstate commerce; the second area is the
regulation and protection of the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce; and the third area is the regulation of those
intrastate activities that have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce."' The Court maintained that because the Act
regulated neither the channels nor the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, it could uphold the Act only as a regulation
of an intrastate activity which had a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.25
While the Court conceded that past decisions upheld a wide
variety of congressional actions which regulated intrastate
activity, it found a vivid pattern in the cases which framed the
issue before it. 26  The pattern indicated that under the
Commerce Clause, Congress could regulate intrastate activity
only if the activity had a substantial effect on interstate
commerce and the activity was commercial in nature. 27 The
front." Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458.
20. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626-30.
21. Id. at 1628-29. Among the decisions cited by the majority were: NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding portions of the National
Labor Relations Act), United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding por-
tions of the Fair Labor Standards Act) and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)
(upholding portions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act).
22. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628. See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 37
(holding that the Commerce Clause could not be used to the extent that it negated
any difference between local and national responsibilities).
23. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1630.
26. Id.
27. Id. The majority conceded that there had been no clear precedent re-
garding the degree to which intrastate activity must affect interstate commerce in
order to fall within the reach of the Commerce Clause. Id. Although prior cases
used both the "effects" and the "substantially affects" tests, the majority ultimately
1995
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majority illustrated the reach of this power by citing a 1942
decision in which the Court upheld the Agricultural Adjustment
Act because it had found that the regulated activity had a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.2 8 The Lopez majority
pointed out, however, that even though the Agricultural
Adjustment Act regulated an entirely intrastate activity, the
activity was commercial in nature.29 The Act at issue in Lopez,
the majority continued, did not seek to regulate an intrastate
commercial activity." Section 922(q) was entirely a criminal
statute that intruded upon the authority of states to enact
criminal statutes.3' Therefore, the Court concluded, because the
Act did not regulate a commercial activity, the Court could not
uphold it under the Commerce Clause.32
The Court noted that § 922(q) lacked an express requirement
that the regulated activity have a connection to interstate
commerce.' 3 Without this requirement, the majority opined,
there would be no basis from which to judge whether a
particular firearm possession had an effect on interstate
commerce.' The Court concluded that such a requirement was
essential in that it would limit the scope of authority of the
regulation to only those specific acts which had a direct
connection to interstate commerce.33
The Court then considered the lack of explicit legislative
findings that supported the argument that the possession of
firearms in a school zone had an adverse effect on interstate
commerce." Although the Court admitted that the lack of such
findings was not dispositive, it noted that the lack of any
findings hampered efforts to evaluate the rationale of Congress
in enacting the legislation.37  The Court discounted the
Government's rationale that because Congress had many years
of experience in dealing with various firearm regulations, it was
concluded that the "substantially effects" test was the proper measure for Commerce
Clause cases. Id.
28. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)
(upholding a provision of the Agricultural Adjustment Act which authorized the Sec-
retary of Agriculture to fine a farmer who grew wheat for his own consumption in
excess of that allowed by the Act).
29. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628.
30. Id. at 1630-31.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1631.
33. Id.
34. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1631-32.
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not unreasonable to conclude that Congress had a sufficient
basis to determine that gun possession within a school zone had
a substantial effect on interstate commerce without issuing
express findings on the matter.38 The majority feared that if
the Government's reasoning was accepted, the Court would have
opened the door for federal regulation in any matter that had
been traditionally reserved to the states. 9 Congress could
regulate matters concerning family law, education and law
enforcement, the Court opined, if Congress simply found that
particular activities related to those areas traditionally
regulated by the states had an impact on interstate
commerce.4 The majority stated that the Court would be at a
loss to find any local activity that could not be regulated by
Congress if this rationale were accepted. 41 According to the
Court, this would effectively destroy the concept of federalism,
which, as the Court previously indicated, was essential to the
preservation of fundamental liberties.4"
Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, considered the two
extremes.' On the one hand, Justice Kennedy cautioned that
the Lopez opinion should be limited and should not be used to
uproot the past sixty years of commerce clause jurisprudence."
On the other hand, Justice Kennedy sought to reinforce the
justification for the Court's role in preserving the federal-state
balance.' Justice Kennedy recognized that many areas of
regulation where the Court had upheld a federal role would
have been unthinkable to the Framers of the Constitution.46
The Constitution, however, was flexible enough to allow the
Court to react to changing economic times and uphold what
Justice Kennedy referred to as a "practical conception of the
commerce power."47 Justice Kennedy stated that this "practical
conception of the commerce power," however, did not give
38. Id. at 1632.
39. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1634.
43. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor joined in Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion. Id.
44. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634. This part of Justice Kennedy's opinion appeared
to be a reaction to Justice Thomas' concurring opinion which called for a total recon-
sideration of the "substantial effects" test. Id.
45. Id. at 1639.
46. Id. at 1637. The Framers, according to Justice Kennedy, could not have
foreseen the modem role of the federal government; nor could they have imagined
that the federal government would play such a role rather than the states. Id. (cit-
ing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992)).
47. Id. at 1636-37.
1995
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Congress a blank check to infringe upon the delicate balance of
power between the states and the federal government."
In this instance, Justice Kennedy reasoned that Congress
sought to use its commerce clause authority to prohibit a purely
local activity, one that ostensibly had no commercial relevance
or a commercial nexus, that was justified only in that the
prohibited activity may have, in some remote manner, an
adverse impact on interstate commerce.49 In this regard,
Justice Kennedy asserted that the Court had the responsibility
to intervene when one branch of the federal government
overstepped its authority." Justice Kennedy stated that nearly
any local activity could be construed as ultimately having an
impact on interstate commerce.51 For Justice Kennedy, such
characterization recognized no limits to the Commerce Clause.52
Justice Kennedy concluded, therefore, that without a more solid
connection to commercial activity, the Act could not be upheld as
a constitutional exercise of Congress' commerce clause
authority.53
Justice Thomas, in a concurring opinion, was more critical of
the past sixty years of commerce clause jurisprudence.'
Although Justice Thomas maintained that he simply sought to
support the majority opinion, Justice Thomas ultimately
concluded that the "substantial effects" test used by the Court to
determine the constitutionality of commerce clause cases should
be reconsidered. 5 Justice Thomas asserted that the Court had
misinterpreted the original intent of the Commerce Clause; and,
therefore, he advocated a more strict interpretation of the
Constitution as it related to the Commerce Clause.5" In this
regard, Justice Thomas stated that the Constitution did not
grant Congress the power to regulate activities having a
"substantial effect" on interstate commerce. 7 Justice Thomas
underscored this point by illustrating that commerce, as the
Framers understood it, simply meant "transportation of
goods."58  In Justice Thomas' opinion, agriculture and
48. Id. at 1637-38.
49. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1640.
50. Id. at 1639.
51. Id. at 1642.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1642 (Thomas, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 1642-43.
56. Id. at 1643-44.
57. Id. at 1644.
58. Id. at 1643-44.
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manufacturing were local activities separate and apart from
commerce."5 Although these activities had a "substantial effect"
on interstate commerce, Justice Thomas reasoned that the
Framer's never intended to allow Congress the power to regulate
local activities."0 According to Justice Thomas, therefore, the
"substantial effects" test did not stand on sound constitutional
footing."' Justice Thomas concluded by noting that in
expanding the power of the Commerce Clause beyond its original
intent, the Clause granted the federal government police powers
well beyond those envisioned by the Framers.62
Justice Breyer issued the primary dissent.6 3 According to
Justice Breyer, the Act was a valid constitutional exercise of
Congress' commerce clause power." Justice Breyer concluded
that the Court's prior commerce clause holdings- permitted
59. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1643.
60. Id. at 1644. Justice Thomas stated that had the framer's meant to allow
Congress to regulate activities that had a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce,
they would have explicitly stated it in the Constitution. Id. at 1646. Justice Thomas
illustrated this point by citing additional enumerated powers in Article I, § 8 of the
Constitution which explicitly give Congress the power to regulate certain activities
that have a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce, including the power to es-
tablish post offices and grant patents and copyrights. Id. at 1644. Justice Thomas
concluded that had the Framers intended to grant Congress the power under the
Commerce Clause to regulate activities which had a "substantial effect" on interstate
commerce, these additional explicit powers enumerated in Article I, § 8 would be
meaningless. Id.
61. Id. at 1646.
62. Id. at 1649.
63. Id. at 1657 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg
joined in Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion. Id.
Justice Stevens wrote a brief, separate dissent concluding that because guns
were "both articles of commerce and articles that can be used to restrain commerce,"
Congress could certainly regulate firearm possession by certain individuals in certain
areas. Id. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Souter also wrote a separate dissent in which he counseled the Court
to adhere to its policy of judicial restraint. Id. at 1651 (Souter, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Souter opined that the Court should refrain from legislating in an area that had
been specifically assigned to another branch under the Constitution. Id. In this in-
stance, Justice Souter believed that the Court needed only to apply the rational
basis test. Id. at 1653. In Justice Souter's opinion, the Court went well beyond that
in this case, reflecting a time long past where substantive due process and di-
rect/indirect effects tests were the standard. Id. at 1653-54. Justice Souter concluded
by objecting to the contention of the majority that the Act was suspect in that it in-
fringed upon areas of traditional state concern. Id. at 1655. Justice Souter stated
that the touchstone of constitutionality under the commerce power was not whether
the regulated area was traditionally reserved to the states, but whether Congress
had a rational basis to determine that the regulated activity had a substantial im-
pact on interstate commerce. Id. at 1656-57. As long as the Act could have passed
the rational basis test, Justice Souter believed the Act should have been upheld. Id.
at 1651-57.
64. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1657.
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Congress to regulate local activities whose cumulative impact
had a "significant effect" on interstate commerce.6
5
Furthermore, because the Constitution delegated to Congress
the power to regulate interstate commerce, Justice Breyer stated
that it was for Congress, not the Court, to make that
determination."6 Therefore, according to Justice Breyer, the
issue before the Court was whether Congress had a rational
basis for concluding that possession of firearms on school
property had a "significant" impact on interstate commerce; and
not, as the majority concluded, whether the activity in question
had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 7
In determining that Congress had a rational basis for
concluding that firearms possession in a school zone had a
significant effect on interstate commerce, Justice Breyer referred
to a voluminous number of reports, studies and hearings that he
believed justified the actions of Congress."
Justice Breyer then addressed the majority's fear that
upholding the Act would expand the reach of the Commerce
Clause into' areas traditionally reserved to the states.6 9 He
concluded that this holding was merely a recognition of the
flexibility of the Constitution to react to changing economic
times and did not represent a significant expansion of the scope
of the Commerce Clause.7" Finally, Justice Breyer criticized the
majority on three points: first, for ignoring sixty years of
commerce clause jurisprudence which upheld congressional
regulation of local activity that had arguably less impact on
interstate commerce than that of the very serious problem of
guns in American schools;7 second, for resurrecting the type of
distinction the Court had rejected long ago (i.e., a distinction
65. Id. at 1657-58.
66. Id. at 1658.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1659-61. Justice Breyer first cited studies and reports which con-
cluded that not only did possession of firearms in schools have an adverse impact on
the educational process, but that gun possession in American schools is more preva-
lent today than at any other time in American history. Id. at 1659. Justice Breyer
then cited studies which showed a direct link between primary and secondary educa-
tion and the economic health of the nation. Id. at 1660. Justice Breyer concluded,
therefore, that Congress could have had a rational basis to conclude that gun pos-
session in school zones had an adverse impact on interstate commerce. Id. at 1661.
69. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1662.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1662-63 (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (uphold-
ing a federal law criminalizing intrastate "loan sharking"), Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding a prohibition of discrimination at local restaurants)
and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding a restriction on the amount
of wheat a local farmer could grow for personal consumption)).
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between commercial and non-commercial activity) when it
abandoned the direct/indirect test because the test was too
vague;" and third, for creating uncertainty in an area of law
which had been settled for nearly sixty years."
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution grants
Congress, among other things, the power to regulate interstate
commerce.7" In Gibbons v. Ogden,75 the Court first expounded
upon the scope of the Commerce Clause. 6 Gibbons presented
the issue of whether a New York law, which granted an
exclusive license to operate steamships in New York waters,
violated the Commerce Clause by conflicting with a federal
licensing statute.77  Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Marshall stated that the New York law was in violation of the
Constitution in that the power granted to Congress to regulate
interstate commerce was plenary and could not be contradicted
by a state law.7"
In reaching this holding, Chief Justice Marshall gave the
commerce clause power a broad scope.79 After first dismissing a
strict interpretation of the Clause, Chief Justice Marshall
defined what he saw as the extent of Congress' commerce clause
power.8" According to Chief Justice Marshall, commerce was
72. Id. at 1663-64.
73. Id. at 1664-65. Justice Breyer believed that the Court's ruling would "re-
strict Congress' ability to enact criminal laws aimed at criminal behavior that, con-
sidered problem by problem rather than instance by instance, seriously threatens the
economic, as well as social, well-being of Americans." Id.
74. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, states in pertinent part: "The Congress shall
have the power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with Indian Tribes." Id.
The failure to provide for a cohesive national economy was a critical reason
for the ineffectiveness of the Articles of Confederation. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 298 (2d ed. 1988). "The most significant delegations of
national power not contained in Article IX (of the Articles of Confederation) were the
grants of the power to tax and the power to regulate interstate . . . commerce, pow-
ers whose absence in the central government had been widely blamed for the fail-
ures of the Articles of Confederation." Id.
75. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
76. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 186.
77. Id. at 2-3. Robert Fulton and Robert Livingston received an exclusive li-
cense under the New York law to operate steamships in New York waters. Id. at 2.
They then assigned Aaron Ogden the right to operate a ferry between New York
and Elizabethtown, N.J. Id. Thomas Gibbons was licensed under a federal statute
and began operating a competing ferry service between Elizabethtown and New
York. Id. Ogden obtained an injunction in the New York courts which prohibited
Gibbons from operating his ferry. Id.
78. Id. at 196.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 189-93. Ogden argued that the Commerce Clause did not include
the power to regulate navigation but was limited to "traffic, to buying and selling,
or the interchange of commodities." Id. at 189. But Chief Justice Marshall concluded
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"commercial intercourse" and Congress' power to regulate
commerce included every type of "commercial intercourse"
among the states." Furthermore, Chief Justice Marshall
contended that the power to regulate commerce could reach the
internal activity of a state when that activity had an effect on
interstate commerce.82  Although Chief Justice Marshall
conceded that the power could not reach the exclusively internal
matters of a state,2 he concluded that the only restraint on the
power was that which Congress had placed on itself.'
The Court had little opportunity over the next seventy years
to interpret the scope of Congress' affirmative use of its
commerce clause power." The passage of congressional
regulation over the next fifty years that dealt with problems of
industrialization and a growing economy, however, brought this
period to an abrupt end.8 The passage of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act of 18907 (the "Sherman Act") gave rise to one of the
earliest challenges to congressional regulation of this type in
that "commerce," as used in the Clause, had always been understood to include
navigation. Id. at 193.
81. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189-90. "Commerce ... is intercourse. It
describes the commercial intercourse between nations ..., in all its branches, and is
regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse." Id. Chief Justice
Marshall reasoned that because the Commerce Clause was read to allow Congress to
regulate "every species of commercial intercourse" with foreign nations, then the
same should be true for Congress' power to regulate commerce among the states. Id.
at 193-94. Furthermore, Chief Justice Marshall defined "among" as "intermingled
with," therefore, "[clommerce among the states cannot stop at the external boundary
line of each state, but may be introduced into the interior." Id. at 194.
82. Id. at 194.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 196-97.
This power ... is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent,
and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the constitu-
tion .... The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the
people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in
this, as in many other instances ... the sole restraints on which they have
relied, to secure them from its abuse.
Id.
85. See Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy,
1933-1964, 59 HARv. L. REV. 645 (1946). Congress enacted no significant legislation
restricting the internal affairs of states and private businesses during this period. Id.
"The Constitution empowers Congress to regulate 'commerce among the several
states' . . . [and] [flor exactly one hundred years after that superficially simple
phrase first appeared in the proposed national charter in 1787, Congress made no
substantial use of the authority granted to it." Id. Most of the litigation regarding
the Commerce Clause involved the "dormant" Commerce Clause. TRIBE, supra note
74, at 307. The "dormant" Commerce Clause refers to those regulations passed by
states which interfered with interstate commerce. Id.
86. See Stern, supra note 85, at 646.
87. 26 Stat. 647, ch. 209 (1890) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
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United States v. E.C. Knight Co."M
In E.C. Knight, the Supreme Court considered whether a
provision of the Sherman Act, which prohibited monopolies in
restraint of interstate commerce, could be applied to rescind the
purchase of stock of four sugar refining companies in
Pennsylvania by the American Sugar Refining Company, when
that purchase created a monopoly in manufacturing.8 9 In the
majority opinion, Chief Justice Fuller acknowledged that
Congress' power over interstate commerce was plenary; but he
indicated that the states, under their police powers, .had sole
authority to regulate intrastate activity which was not
commerce." Chief Justice Fuller, declaring that manufacturing
was not commerce, ruled that Congress could not regulate a
monopoly in manufacturing under the Sherman Act.91
In declaring that commerce and manufacturing were distinct
activities.92 Chief Justice Fuller relied on past cases which
dealt not with Congress' affirmative commerce clause power, but
with the "dormant" Commerce Clause. 3 Coe v. Errol4 and
Kidd v. Pearson95 were two of the cases cited by Justice
Fuller.9 In Coe, the Supreme Court ruled that a state
maintained regulatory power over goods produced within that
state even though the owner of the goods intended to transport
the goods in interstate commerce.97 In Kidd, the Supreme
Court ruled that a state's prohibition of the manufacturing of
intoxicating beverages did not unconstitutionally interfere with
Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce even though
the prohibition had an indirect effect on interstate commerce.98
88. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
89. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 11.
90. Id. at 12. The Court stated: "That which belongs to commerce is within
the jurisdiction of the United States, but that which does not belong to commerce is
within the jurisdiction of the police power of the state." Id.
91. Id. at 17.
92. Id. at 12. The Court stated that "[clommerce succeeds to manufacture and
is not a part of it." Id.
93. Id. at 13-14. See, e.g., Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886) (holding that
Congress' power over interstate commerce commences not when one contemplated the
movement of a product in interstate commerce, but when the product actually began
to move in interstate commerce); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888) (holding that it
was within the police power of a state to prohibit the manufacture of intoxicating
beverages, and that the prohibition was not an unconstitutional infringement upon
the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce).
94. 116 U.S. 517 (1886) (giving a broad interpretation to a state's taxing pow-
er).
95. 128 U.S. 1 (1888) (giving a broad interpretation to a state's police power).
96. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 13-15.
97. Coe, 116 U.S. at 529.
98. Kidd, 128 U.S. at 26.
1995
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Chief Justice Fuller reasoned that if states could regulate
manufacturing as a local activity then Congress could not
regulate manufacturing as a part of its authority to regulate
commerce between the states.99 This was so even though the
manufacturer intended to ship the goods in interstate commerce,
and the state regulations had an indirect effect on interstate
commerce.' Otherwise, Chief Justice Fuller concluded, the
states would lose their police power over the internal operations
of businesses within their borders. 10
While cases such as E.C. Knight dealt a blow to the ability of
Congress to reach internal activities which had a practical,
albeit "indirect" effect on interstate commerce, the Court
developed an alternative approach in deciding several railroad
related cases in the early twentieth century.0 2 Houston, East
& West Texas Railway Co. v. United States,' commonly
referred to as the Shreveport Rate Cases, best illustrated this
new approach. The Shreveport Rate Cases considered whether
Congress, in creating the Interstate Commerce Commission (the
"ICC"), could regulate the intrastate rates of an interstate rail
carrier, when the rates had a discriminatory effect on interstate
commerce."4 The Supreme Court maintained that the power of
Congress to regulate interstate commerce included the power to
99. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 16.
100. Id.
101. Id. Chief Justice Fuller concluded: "Slight reflection will show that if the
national power extends to all contracts and combinations in manufacture, agriculture,
mining, and other productive industries, whose ultimate result may affect external
commerce, comparatively little of business operations and affairs would be left for
state control." Id.
102. See, e.g., Southern Ry. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911) (upholding
penalties assessed against a rail carrier that violated the Federal Safety Appliance
Act); Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 223 U.S. 1 (1912) (upholding the au-
thority of Congress to regulate the liability of a rail carrier, whether or not a negli-
gent employee was employed in interstate or intrastate commerce); Railroad Commis-
sion v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 257 U.S. 563 (1922) (upholding an order of the Inter-
state Commerce Comm'n increasing the intrastate passenger rail rates of certain rail
carriers to match an increase it had ordered for interstate passenger rates under the
same rationale as that of Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342
(1914)).
103. 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
104. The Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. at 350. Congress authorized the ICC,
under the Interstate Commerce Act, to set rates for interstate rail carriers. Id. In
this instance, the ICC ordered several railroads to increase their intrastate rates for
hauling goods within Texas to a rate proportionate to that which the ICC set for
hauling goods from Shreveport, Louisiana to destinations within Texas. Id. at 349.
The rail carriers objected to the ICC order which prohibited the carriers from char-
ging higher rates to ship goods from Shreveport to points within Texas than the
rates they charged for equal distances for hauling goods between points within Tex-
as. Id.
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protect interstate commerce." 5 Thus, the Court stated that
Congress had the power to regulate the activities of interstate
carriers which had an injurious effect on interstate commerce,
regardless of whether those activities were deemed
intrastate.' 6 The Court drew upon previous railroad cases
which upheld Congress' use of its commerce clause power to
regulate the intrastate activity of interstate railroads.' 7 While
the Court conceded that these cases sustained regulations
geared mainly toward ensuring safety on interstate railways, it
stressed that the cases vividly demonstrated that Congress may
prohibit entities engaged in both intrastate and interstate
commerce from using the former to injure the latter.'0 8
The Court was more receptive in the early part of the
twentieth century to Congress' affirmative use of its commerce
clause power in prohibiting the interstate shipment of goods that
Congress deemed harmful.' 9  The case of Champion v.
Ames,"' which set the precedent in this field, illustrated
Congress' use of its commerce prohibiting power."' In
Champion, the Court considered whether Congress' power to
regulate commerce included the authority to prohibit the
interstate shipment of lottery tickets when Congress deemed
them injurious to the public welfare.' The Court ruled that
Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce included the
ability to prohibit the interstate shipment of lottery tickets."'
Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, reasoned that if
105. Id. at 351. See, e.g., The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1871).
106. The Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. at 351.
107. Id. at 352.
108. Id. at 353. The Court acknowledged that Congress could not regulate the
internal commerce of a state; but that Congress could take all reasonable means to
protect interstate commerce even if it meant regulating the intrastate aspects of an
interstate rail carrier's business. Id.
109. See, e.g., Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911) (upholding
the confiscation of tainted eggs which had been shipped in interstate commerce un-
der the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308
(1913) (upholding the Mann Act which prohibited the interstate transportation of
women for "prostitution and debauchery").
110. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
111. Champion, 188 U.S. at 363.
112. Id. at 354. Champion challenged his conviction for conspiring to transport
lottery tickets in interstate commerce under an act of Congress "entitled 'An Act for
the Suppression of Lottery Traffic through National and Interstate Commerce and
the Postal Service, Subject to the Jurisdiction of the United States.'" Id. at 321.
Champion argued that the Act exceeded the Congress' commerce clause power be-
cause lottery tickets were not, and could not be made by Congress, "commerce
among the states, within the meaning of the clause of the Constitution." Id. at 321-
25.
113. Id. at 363.
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Congress had the power to regulate the shipment of goods
between the states, it made little sense that Congress must
allow the interstate shipment of goods it deemed intolerable and
detrimental to the public welfare.11 4 The majority concluded
that if the states could prohibit the sale of lottery tickets which
they deemed harmful to their citizens, then certainly Congress,
in the interest of protecting commerce between the states, could
prohibit the interstate shipment of lottery tickets.115
The commerce prohibiting technique received a chilling
reception, however, when the Supreme Court considered the
case of Hammer v. Dagenhart."6 Hammer raised the issue of
whether Congress, under its commerce clause power, could
prohibit the interstate shipment of goods produced by a
manufacturer using child labor."7  The Court ruled that
Congress' prohibition of interstate transportation in goods
produced by child labor exceeded its power under the Commerce
Clause."' The Court distinguished previous cases in which it
upheld the commerce prohibiting technique.' The Court
114. Id. at 355-56. Justice Harlan also reiterated that the power of Congress
was plenary and that under the holding of McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819), Congress had broad powers in implementing the means by
which it executed its enumerated powers. Champion, 188 U.S. at 355-56.
115. Champion, 188 U.S. at 357. The Court expressly limited its decision in the
case to the prohibition of lottery tickets in interstate commerce. Id. at 363. The
Court did not decide the extent of this commerce prohibiting technique. Id. Justice
Harlan addressed the issue of whether Congress could prohibit anything from inter-
state commerce, regardless of its impact on society, by stating that the Court would
consider those cases when they come before the Court. Id. Justice Harlan suggested,
however, that the only remedy to Congress' prohibition of articles in interstate com-
merce rested with the people whom they represented, and not with the courts. Id.
116. 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941). A father, on behalf of his two sons, both minors, brought suit to enjoin the
enforcement of a federal law prohibiting the transportation of goods in interstate
commerce that were produced by child labor. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 268.
117. Id. at 269. Section 1 of the statute provided in pertinent part:
That no producer, manufacturer, or dealer shall ship or deliver for shipment
interstate or foreign commerce any article or commodity the product of any
mine or quarry, situated in the United States, in which within thirty days
prior to the time of removal of such product therefrom children under the age
of sixteen years have been employed or permitted to work, or any article or
commodity the product of any . . . manufacturing establishment, situated in
the United States, in which within thirty days prior to the removal of such
product therefrom children under the age of fourteen years have been em-
ployed or permitted to work, or children between the ages of fourteen and
sixteen have been employed or permitted to work more than eight hours in
any day, or more than six days in any week, or after the hour of 7 o'clock
postmeridian, or before the hour of 6 o'clock antemeridian.
Act of Sept. 1, 1916, ch. 432, § 1, 39 Stat. 675, 675.
118. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 277.
119. Id. at 270. See, e.g., Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903); Hipolite Egg
Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308
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maintained that in these cases, the offending party needed the
use of interstate transportation to accomplish the harm
Congress sought to regulate. 2 Therefore, the Court opined
that the only way Congress could regulate the harm was to
prohibit the use of interstate transportation in the
commodities.' According to the Court, that situation simply
did not exist in Hammer because the prohibited item was not
harmful in and of itself.22 The Court concluded that the Act
was merely an attempt to control the means of production
within a state, which was clearly beyond the reach of the
commerce clause power of Congress. 2
The Great Depression of the 1930's brought a new era of
congressional regulation that dealt with national economic
problems, and with it arose new limitations on Congress' ability
to regulate local activity deemed by it to have an adverse impact
on interstate commerce.' Congress first felt the sting of
rejection in this regard in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States," where operators of a chicken slaughterhouse
and market challenged a provision of the National Industrial
Recovery Act of 1933."2 The issue in Schechter was whether
(1913).
120. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 271.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 271-72. The Court stated:
[I]n each of these instances the use of interstate transportation was necessary
to the accomplishment of harmful results. . . . This element is wanting in the
present case. . . . The act in its effect does not regulate transportation among
the states, but aims to standardize the ages at which children may be em-
ployed in mining and manufacturing within the states. The goods shipped are
of themselves harmless. . . . When offered for shipment, and before transporta-
tion begins, the labor of their production is over, and the mere fact that they
were intended for interstate commerce transportation does not make their
production subject to Federal control under the commerce power.
Id.
123. Id. at 272. (citing Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888) and Coe v. Errol,
116 U.S. 517 (1886)). Justice Holmes issued a strong dissent in which he maintained
that Congress' power to prohibit interstate commerce extended to the power to pro-
hibit goods of any character, not just those inherently evil. Id. at 277-81 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). If, Justice Holmes stated, Congress chose to attack a societal ill, it mat-
tered not whether the particular evil occurred before or after a commodity was
shipped in interstate commerce. Id. According to Justice Holmes, Congress merely
needed to conclude that the interstate transportation aided the societal ill Congress
sought to cure. Id.
124. Stern, supra note 85, at 646.
125. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
126. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 519-21. The National Industrial Recovery Act of
1933 authorized the President of the United States to approve or prescribe codes in
certain trades or businesses which, inter alia, could regulate hours, wages and allow
for collective bargaining of the employees in those trades or businesses. See 48 Stat.
195, ch. 90 (1933).
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Congress exceeded its commerce clause power when it
authorized the President of the United States to establish the
Live Poultry Code, which set hours and wages for individuals
employed in the poultry industry.'27 The Supreme Court ruled
that because Schechter's transactions at the slaughterhouse and
market were neither "in" interstate commerce nor did they
"directly affect" interstate commerce, Congress had exceeded its
power under the Commerce Clause.'28 Although the Court
conceded that the company received its poultry through
interstate transportation, the Court found that Schechter's
activities were completely local because the company
slaughtered and sold poultry totally within the borders of the
state.'2 9 Thus, the Court ruled that Schechter's activities could
not be considered "in" the stream of interstate commerce and
were beyond the reach of federal regulation.2 0 Furthermore,
although the Government displayed how wages and hours had
an effect on interstate commerce, the Court concluded that this
was merely an indirect effect.'3 1 The Court feared that if
Congress could regulate wages and hours because of some
remote effect on interstate commerce, then the federal
government could regulate any production-related matter.1
2
In Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 3 3 the Supreme Court
invalidated yet another congressional act which sought to
regulate the hours and wages of workers."M In Carter, the
Court considered whether Congress went beyond the reach of its
commerce clause power when it enacted the Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act of 1935 which, inter alia, regulated the hours
and wages of those employed in the mining industry.'35 The
Court, as it did in Schechter, determined that because worker's
wages and the hours they worked had only an indirect effect on
interstate commerce, Congress exceeded its authority under the
127. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 542.
128. Id. at 542-43.
129. Id. at 543.
130. Id. See, e.g., Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922); Swift & Co. v. Unit-
ed States 196 U.S. 375 (1904).
131. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 548-49.
132. Id. at 549.
133. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
134. Carter, 298 U.S. at 297. The Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935
established a national bituminous coal code which regulated wages and hours of
those employed in the industry and imposed a tax on coal companies that failed to
comply with the code. See Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, ch. 824, 49
Stat. 991 (repealed 1937).
135. Carter, 298 U.S. at 278.
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Commerce Clause in regulating this aspect of production.
136
The Court reasoned that the labor provisions in the Act mainly
affected production of coal and did not affect interstate
commerce.'37 Production, the Court continued, was a local
activity beyond the reach of Congress to regulate under the
Commerce Clause because production had only an indirect effect
on interstate commerce as opposed to a direct, or immediate,
effect."'3 The Court stated that Congress could regulate
intrastate activities which had a direct effect on interstate
commerce, but not those which had only an indirect effect.'39
The Court concluded by noting that the fact that a commodity
may have been intended for interstate shipment did not place
the production of the commodity under the power of federal
regulation.'"
By 1936, the Court had developed two distinct theories under
which it could determine whether congressional regulation of
intrastate activity which Congress deemed as having an impact
on interstate commerce was constitutional.' The Court
measured the constitutionality of congressional regulation by
considering whether a regulated activity had a direct or indirect
effect on interstate commerce' or by considering whether the
regulated activity had such an effect on interstate commerce
that it was necessary for Congress to regulate the entire field of
activity.'" Although momentum appeared to be on the side of
the direct/indirect effects evaluation,'" the test for determining
the constitutionality of federal regulation of intrastate activity
which Congress deemed to have an effect on interstate
commerce changed abruptly in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp. 14
136. Id. at 307-09.
137. Id. at 304.
138. Id. at 307-08.
139. Id. at 309 (citing A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495 (1935).
140. Carter, 298 U.S. at 303.
141. Stern, supra note 85, at 647.
142. See, e.g., Carter, 298 U.S. at 307-10; Schechter, 295 U.S. at 546; United
States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16 (1895).
143. See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 257 U.S. 563 (1922);
The Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914); Southern Ry. v. United States, 222
U.S. 20 (1911).
144. See, e.g., Carter, 298 U.S. at 309; Schechter, 295 U.S. at 495.
145. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Some commentators believe that this reversal was due
to President Roosevelt's so-called Court Packing Plan. Stern, supra note 85, at 677-
82. Unhappy with the decisions of the Court regarding his New Deal legislative
agenda, President Roosevelt appealed to Congress and the people of the United
States to dramatically change the makeup of the United States Supreme Court. Id.
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In Jones & Laughlin, the Supreme Court considered whether
a federal regulation, which protected the right of workers to
organize and collectively bargain, could apply to workers
employed in manufacturing and production at Jones &
Laughlin's steel plants in Pennsylvania.1 4' The Court stated
that where the practical result of labor turmoil, which Congress
deemed emanated from the inability of workers to organize and
collectively bargain, had a substantial effect on interstate
commerce, Congress had the authority to regulate labor
relations under its commerce clause power. 147  Taking into
account the wide range of businesses in which Jones & Laughlin
engaged in across the United States, and the importance of its
Pennsylvania plants to those businesses, the Court ruled that
labor relations at the plant were exactly the type of local activity
that Congress could reach under the Commerce Clause due to
the substantial impact those relations had on interstate
commerce.' 4 In setting aside Jones & Laughlin's argument
Expressing doubts about the abilities of the aged members of the Court (six of the
Justices were over 70), the President's plan called for the appointment of one addi-
tional justice for each current Supreme Court Justice over the age of 70. Id. While
the plan ultimately languished in Congress, President Roosevelt proclaimed overall
victory with the decision in Jones & Laughlin. Id.
146. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 34. The NLRB charged Jones & Laughlin
with unfair labor practices under the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. Id. at
22. Specifically, the NLRB charged that Jones & Laughlin fired employees because
of their pro-labor activities. Id. The NLRB sought reinstatement of the employees
and recovery of lost wages. Id.
147. Id. at 41-42. Although the opposing sides argued over whether or not the
activity at Jones & Laughlin's plants could be considered "in" the stream of com-
merce, as were the stockyards in Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1904)
and Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922), the Court did not feel it had to ana-
lyze this case in that fashion. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 36-37. The Court stat-
ed:
[Wie do not find it necessary to determine whether these features of
defendant's business dispose of the asserted analogy to the "stream of
commerce" cases. The instances in which that metaphor has been used are but
particular, and not exclusive, illustrations of the protective power which the
Government invokes in support of the present Act. The congressional authority
to protect interstate commerce from burdens and obstructions is not limited to
transactions which can be deemed to be an essential part of a "flow" of inter-
state . . . commerce .... That power is plenary .... Although activities may
be intrastate in character when separately considered, if they have such a
close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is es-
sential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions,
Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control.
Id.
148. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 41-42. The Court queried:
[W]hen industries organize themselves on a national scale, making their rela-
tionship to interstate commerce the dominant factor in their activities, how
can it be maintained that their industrial labor relations constitute a forbid-
den field into which Congress may not enter when it is necessary to protect
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that Congress could not regulate production,"" the Court
concluded that simply showing that the employees labored in
production was not dispositive"'5 The Court considered the
actual effect the labor had on interstate commerce to be a more
important consideration."'
Four years later, the Supreme Court further expanded the
scope of the Commerce Clause in United States v. Darby.'52
George Darby's ("Darby") challenge to the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 (the "FLSA") raised two issues."' The first issue
considered by the Court was whether Congress could prohibit
the interstate shipment of lumber products when the employees
who produced the products labored under conditions inconsistent
with those prescribed by the FLSA.'M The second issue was
whether Congress could mandate an employer to adhere to the
prescribed wage and hour provisions of the FLSA when the
employer was engaged in manufacturing goods, a local activity,
which it intended to ship in interstate commerce. 5'
In addressing the first issue, the Court ruled that Congress
could prohibit the interstate shipment of goods produced by
manufacturers who did not adhere to the labor provisions of the
FLSA.5 5 Justice Stone, writing for the majority, dismissed
Darby's two arguments against the applicability of the
FLSA.' In expressly overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart,
Justice Stone concluded that Congress' plenary power over
interstate commerce from the paralyzing consequences of industrial war?
Id. at 41.
149. Id. at 34 (citing A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495, 546 (1935) and Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 288, 310-11 (1936)).
The Court distinguished these cases in the instant case. Id. at 40-41. The Jones &
Laughlin Court stated that in Schechter, "we found that the effect there was so re-
mote as to be beyond the Federal power. . . .To find immediacy or directness there
was to find it almost everywhere, a result inconsistent with the maintenance of our
Federal system." Id. The provisions invalidated in Carter, the Court reasoned, were
done so upon due process and improper delegation of legislative power grounds,
which did not concern the Court in the case presently before it. Id. These cases,
therefore, were not of precedential value. Id.
150. Id. at 40.
151. Id.
152. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
153. Darby, 312 U.S. at 108. Darby operated a lumber mill in Georgia. Id. at
111. He was charged with violating provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act
which prohibited the interstate shipment of goods produced by employees earning
less than a prescribed minimum wage and working more than prescribed maximum
hours. Id. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
154. Darby, 312 U.S. at 108.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 115.
157. Id. at 115-16.
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interstate commerce allowed it to prohibit any article from
interstate transportation, notwithstanding the inherent qualities
of that article."8 Furthermore, Justice Stone noted that the
motives of Congress for banning a particular commodity from
interstate commerce did not matter because it was for Congress
alone to determine what could or could not be transported in
interstate commerce. 159
Justice Stone addressed the second issue by stating that the
regulatory authority Congress had over interstate commerce
extended to intrastate activities that had a substantial effect on
interstate commerce." When Congress legislated in this area,
Justice Stone continued, Congress could enact any and all
measures reasonably adapted to enforce its enumerated
power.'' Justice Stone concluded that because the FLSA was
meant to prohibit the use of interstate commerce as a means to
promote unfair labor practices, Congress was within its
authority to force manufacturers to adhere to certain minimum
labor standards." 2
Any lingering doubts as to the extent of the power of Congress
to reach intrastate activity that had an effect on interstate
commerce were firmly and unanimously put to rest in Wickard
v. Filburn.163 In Wickard, the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether a provision of the Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1938 exceeded the commerce clause authority of Congress
when the Act regulated the amount of wheat a local farmer
could grow for his own consumption.' Justice Jackson,
158. Id. at 116-17.
159. Darby, 312 U.S. at 115.
160. Id. at 118.
161. Id. at 121.
162. Id. at 122-23. Justice Stone limited the decision in Carter to the extent it
was inconsistent with the ruling in Darby. Id. at 123. Justice Stone also discussed
the alleged limitations the Tenth Amendment placed upon Congress' authority to
reach local activity:
Our conclusion is unaffected by the Tenth Amendment which provides: "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States are reserved to the States respectively or to the people."
The amendment states but a truism. . . . There is nothing in the history of
its adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship
between the national and state governments as it had been established by the
Constitution before the amendment or that its purpose was other than to allay
fears that the new national government might seek to exercise powers not
granted, and that the states might not be able to exercise fully their reserved
powers.
Id. at 123-24.
163. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
164. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 118. Filburn challenged the Agricultural Adjustment
Act after he received a fine for growing too much wheat in violation of provisions of
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writing for a unanimous Court, stated that irrespective of the
local nature of an activity, whether it was considered commerce
or not, if the activity has a "substantial economic effect" on
interstate commerce, Congress could regulate it. 5' Because the
use of home grown wheat competed with wheat in interstate
commerce and affected the price of the wheat, Congress, the
Court reasoned, could regulate its production. 6' The Court
dismissed the challenge to the Act as an unconstitutional
encroachment on a local activity.'67 In so doing, the Court
firmly rejected the use of such approaches as the direct/indirect
effects distinction to determine the constitutionality of
legislation which regulated manufacturing and production."8
This test, according to the Court, completely disregarded the
actual impact that an activity had on interstate commerce. 169
The Court concluded by noting that even though the impact on
interstate commerce, when considered alone, may have been
slight, it was the cumulative effect of the actions, added to those




The decision in Wickard did not answer the question of how
far Congress could go in regulating local activity when it
concluded that the activity had an impact on interstate
commerce. In deciding two civil rights cases on the same day in
1964, the Court seemed to answer the question by stating that
Congress had no limits.
71
In the first case, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States,'72 a motel owner alleged that a provision of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,' which prohibits places of public
the Act. Id. at 113. The Act sought to control the amount of wheat in interstate
commerce by, inter alia, regulating the amount of wheat a farmer could grow in
certain years. Id. at 114-15
165. Id. at 125. The Court stated:
But even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded as
commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it ex-
erts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective
of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined
as "direct" or "indirect."
Id.
166. Id. at 128-29.
167. Id. at 124-25.
168. Id.
169. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124.
170. Id. at 127-28.
171. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
172. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
173. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 201(a)-(c), (e) and §§ 203-
Duquesne Law Review
accommodation from refusing rooms to travellers based on race,
exceeded Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce
because the operation of the motel was a strictly local
activity.174 The Court disagreed, ruling that Congress could
prohibit racial discrimination by motels which catered to
interstate travellers, no matter how local the operation, when
the discrimination had an effect on interstate commerce.7 5 In
this instance, the Court relied on the nature of the motel
business, which depended heavily upon interstate travellers,
176
and the recorded testimony before Congress regarding the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which revealed strong
evidence that discrimination had a substantial impact on
interstate commerce. 7 7 The Court concluded that this was
more than enough evidence to concede that Congress could
constitutionally prohibit racial discrimination at locally owned
motels. 178
The Court's decision in Katzenbach v. McClung7 ' mirrored
the decision in Heart of Atlanta.' In Katzenbach, the
Supreme Court considered whether the provisions in Title II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applied to a restaurant which
refused service to individuals based on race when a significant
amount of the food the restaurant served arrived through
interstate commerce. ' The Court found the provisions of Title
II, as applied to a restaurant which received a significant
amount of the food it served through interstate commerce, to be
within Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce.
8 2
Similarly, as in Heart of Atlanta, the Court in Katzenbach relied
on congressional hearings which illustrated the impact that
07 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a)-(c), (e) and §§ 2000a-2 to 2000a-6 (1988)). The
Civil Rights Act prohibits certain places of public accommodation from discriminating
on the basis of race. Id.
174. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 247-49. Title II of the Civil Rights Act pro-
hibits discrimination in any public lodging facilities, restaurants, or cinemas if the
operation of such public accommodations affects commerce. Id. at 247.
175. Id. at 258. The Court stated that "[i]t is said that the operation of the
motel here is of a purely local character. But, assuming this to be true, '[i]f it is in-
terstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation
which applies the squeeze." Id. (quoting United States v. Women's Sportswear Man-
ufacturers Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949)).
176. Id. at 243.
177. Id. at 252-53.
178. Id. at 258.
179. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
180. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 298-304.
181. Id. at 298. Ollie's Barbecue refused to serve African-Americans. Id. at 296-
97.
182. Id. at 304-05.
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racial discrimination in restaurants had on interstate
commerce." 3  The Court also reiterated its conclusion in
Wickard v. Filburn, dismissing the appellee's contention that the
volume of food served at the restaurant was too insignificant to
have an impact on interstate commerce.8 4  The Court
concluded by noting that it would not simply act as a rubber
stamp for federal regulation of intrastate activity which
Congress deemed had an impact on interstate commerce."
The Court continued, however, by stating that where Congress
had a "rational basis" for concluding that a regulated activity
affected interstate commerce, the Court's inquiry into the
validity of that regulation ceased.8 6
The Supreme Court expanded the scope of the Commerce
Clause even further in Perez v. United States.'87 In Perez, the
Court entertained a challenge to Title II of the Consumer Credit
Protection Act." The issue in Perez was whether Title II of
the Consumer Credit Protection Act exceeded the power of
Congress under its commerce clause authority when the Act
sought to prohibit extortionate credit activities which took place
completely intrastate.'89  The Court found that because
Congress reasonably concluded that the type of activity the Act
prohibited had an effect on interstate commerce, Title II was
well within the power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce.' The Court relied on the fact that congressional
findings graphically illustrated the adverse impact that "loan
sharking" had on interstate commerce;' 9' and that past cases
clearly established that if an activity, whether or not local in
183. Id. at 299-300.
184. Id. at 300-01.
185. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 303.
186. Id. at 303-04. The Court stated:
Of course, the mere fact that Congress has said when particular activity shall
be deemed to affect commerce does not preclude further examination by this
Court. But where we find that the legislators, in light of the facts and testi-
mony before them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory
scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our investigation is at an
end.
Id.
187. 402 U.S. 146 (1971)
188. Perez, 402 U.S. at 146. Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act
found that organized crime was a nationwide problem; that extortionate credit deal-
ings financed a significant amount of that activity; that these dealings were carried
on in interstate commerce; and that even local "loan sharking" activity had an effect
on interstate commerce. Id. Therefore, Congress sought to prohibit all interstate and
intrastate "loan sharking" activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 891 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
189. Perez, 402 U.S. at 146-47.




character, had an effect on interstate commerce, Congress could
regulate it.'92  The Court concluded by dismissing the
contention of the petitioner, Perez, that his action, when taken
alone, had little or no impact on interstate commerce.193 The
Court stated that it was required to review the constitutionality
of the Act, not by the effect that Perez' act alone had on
interstate commerce, but rather by the effect that the entire
"class of activities" had on interstate commerce.194
The Court reaffirmed its position that Congress' commerce
clause power reached intrastate activities which had an effect on
interstate commerce when it upheld the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977 in Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n. '9 In Hodel, Justice Marshall
framed the issue of the case as whether the Surface Mining
Conservation and Reclamation Act was a valid exercise of
Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce when the Act
sought to regulate surface mining on a national scale.'
Justice Marshall reiterated past decisions of the Court in stating
that when Congress rationally determined that a local activity
had an effect on interstate commerce, Congress was well within
its power under the Commerce Clause to regulate in that
field. ' 7  In this instance, Justice Marshall relied on
congressional hearings, which evidenced the effect that surface
mining had on interstate commerce, to determine that Congress
had a rational basis to find that the activity of surface mining
had an effect on interstate commerce.'98 Therefore, Justice
Marshall concluded, because coal was shipped in interstate
commerce and the production of the coal had an effect on
interstate commerce, Congress could regulate the production of
coal in accordance with the Act.'9
192. Id. at 151-52 (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) and
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942)).
193. Id. at 152.
194. Perez, 402 U.S. at 154 (citing Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300
(1964) and Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 193 (1968), overruled by National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)).
195. 452 U.S. 264, 305 (1981).
196. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276. The appellees sought to frame the issue as
whether land could be considered "in" commerce, and therefore whether land reg-
ulations could be promulgated by Congress under its commerce clause power. Id. at
275.
197. Id. at 277.
198. Id. at 277-80.
199. Id. at 281. Justice Rehnquist issued a foreboding concurrence in which he
stated:
It is illuminating for purposes of reflection, if not for argument, to note that
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A review of the past sixty years of commerce clause
jurisprudence reveals an inconsistency regarding the extent to
which an activity must affect interstate commerce before
Congress may regulate that activity."' 0  Must Congress
conclude that an activity merely affects interstate commerce to
employ its commerce clause power or must Congress find that
the activity substantially affects interstate commerce before it
acts?2"' It is not surprising that Chief Justice Rehnquist, in
view of his concurring opinion in Hodel, used Lopez to establish
the stricter standard. What is surprising, however, is the brevity
with which Chief Justice Rehnquist treats this significant
clarification. The Chief Justice acknowledged the conflict, then
in fewer words, and with no citations, simply resolved the
matter in favor of the "substantially effects test."2 2 The Court
gave no firm direction as to when an activity ceased to have a
substantial impact on interstate commerce. The Court merely
hinted at where the line should be drawn in Maryland v.
Wirtz."' In Wirtz, the majority responded to the fears of the
one of the greatest "fictions" of our federal system is that the Congress exer-
cises only those powers delegated to it, while the remainder are reserved to
the States or to the people. The manner in which this Court has construed
the Commerce Clause amply illustrates the extent of this fiction. Although it
is clear that the people, through the States, delegated authority to Congress to
[regulate interstate commerce], one could easily get the sense from this Court's
opinions that the federal system exists only at the sufferance of Congress.
Id. at 307-08 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist went on to take excep-
tion to the test employed by the Court in finding federal regulation of intrastate
activity within the commerce clause power of Congress:
[T]he Court asserts that regulation will be upheld if Congress had a rational
basis for finding that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce ...
In my view, the Court misstates the test . it has long been established
that the commerce power does not reach activity which merely "affects" inter-
state commerce. There must instead be a showing that regulated activity has
a substantial effect on that commerce.
Id. at 311-12.
200. See, e.g., Hodel, 452 U.S. at 279 (stating that "[t]he court must defer to a
congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce"); Heart of
Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 255 (stating that -"the determinative test of the exercise of
power by the Congress under the Commerce Clause is simply whether the activity
sought to be regulated ...has a real and substantial relation to the national inter-
est"); Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125 (stating that "if [the] activity be local . . . it may
still ...be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on inter-
state commerce"); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942)
(stating that "tihe commerce power is not confined in its exercise to the regulation
of commerce among the states ...[but] extends to those activities intrastate which
so affect interstate commerce or the exertion of the power of Congress over it, as to
make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end.").
201. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
202. Id.
203. 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled by National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
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dissent that congressional power under the Commerce Clause
was limitless." 4 The majority in Lopez attempted to allay
these fears by stating that Congress could not employ "a
relatively trivial impact" on interstate commerce to reach
intrastate activities.0 5
If this is what the Court meant by "merely affects" as opposed
to "substantially affects," then it is unclear why it did not apply
this rationale in Lopez. It is clear that the majority found the
Government's evidence that gun possession in school zones had
a substantial effect on interstate commerce unconvincing.2 6
Furthermore, the majority indicated that the Supreme Court is
the ultimate arbiter of what does or does not have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. 27 The Court, then, could simply
let this issue be dispositive and conclude that because gun
possession in school zones does not have a substantial impact on
interstate commerce, Congress may not regulate the activity.25
Instead of deciding the issue in terms of whether Congress
had a rational basis upon which to conclude that gun possession
in school zones had a substantial impact on interstate
commerce, the Court resolved the issue in a most troubling
manner. 215 Chief Justice Rehnquist, relying on the past sixty
years of commerce clause decisions, concluded that Congress
may only regulate those intrastate activities that have a
substantial impact on interstate commerce and which are
commercial in nature.2 0 Chief Justice Rehnquist drew this
conclusion by alluding to past commerce clause cases which, in
his opinion, all involved the regulation of economic activity. " '
Even Wickard, the Chief Justice declared, the most far reaching
example of the commerce clause cases, involved the regulation of
an economic activity.2
Chief Justice Rehnquist's novel assumption is reminiscent of
the conclusion drawn in Hammer, where the Court declared
invalid the prohibition of goods in interstate commerce because
528 (1985).
204. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 196-97 n.27.
205. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629.
206. See id. at 1631-32.
207. Id. at 1629 n.2.
208. This is essentially the manner in which Justice Breyer analyzed the issue
in his dissent where he concluded that Congress had a rational basis to conclude
that gun possession in school zones had a substantial impact on interstate com-
merce. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1659-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
209. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.





they were not inherently evil.21 In Hammer, the Court took a
retrospective look at cases that had allowed Congress to prohibit
certain goods from interstate commerce and concluded that
those cases permitted Congress to prohibit from interstate
commerce only those goods which were inherently evil.2"4
Darby recognized the fallacy and impracticality of this
assumption and explicitly overruled Hammer twenty-three years
later.215
The majority's assumption is not only novel, but it also
contradicts the holding of Wickard, the case the Court used to
justify its conclusion. 16 While the disputed regulation in
Wickard involved an essentially commercial activity, the Court
asserted that any intrastate activity, no matter what its
character, could be reached by Congress if the activity had a
substantial impact on interstate commerce.2"7 This assertion
reflects the recent history of commerce clause jurisprudence
which indicates that congressional regulation of intrastate
activity should be evaluated on the practical effects the activity
has on interstate commerce.21
Justice Breyer's dissent called into question the majority's
reliance on the newly created distinction between commercial
and non-commercial activity.1 9 Justice Breyer stated that the
cases cited by the majority as examples of this distinction
focused primarily on the practical effects an activity has on
interstate commerce and not whether the activity was
commercial or non-commercial.220  The issue, therefore,
according to Justice Breyer, should have been whether Congress
213. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 270-77.
214. Id. at 270-72.
215. Darby, 312 U.S. at 116. The Court stated:
Hammer v. Dagenhart has not been followed. The distinction on which the
decision was rested that Congressional power to prohibit interstate commerce
is limited to articles which in themselves have some harmful or deleterious
property-a distinction which was novel when made and unsupported by any
provision of the Constitution-has long since been abandoned.
Id.
216. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
217. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125. The Court stated: "[E]ven if appellee's activity
be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its
nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on inter-
state commerce." Id.
218. See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 41-42. The Court in Jones &
Laughlin stated: "We have often said that interstate commerce itself is a practical
conception. It is equally true that interference with that commerce must be ap-
praised by a judgement that does not ignore actual experience." Id.
219. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1663-64 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
220. Id. (citing Wickard, 317 U.S. at 122-25, McClung, 379 U.S. at 301-03 and
Perez, 402 U.S. at 150-52).
1995
Duquesne Law Review
could have had a rational basis to conclude that gun possession
in school zones substantially affected interstate commerce.'
Since the landmark case of Jones & Laughlin, the Court has
admonished Congress that it will not stand by and let Congress
erode the concept of federalism through regulation of intrastate
activity deemed to affect interstate commerce. 2 Only once in
nearly sixty years, however, has the Court held invalid
Congress' affirmative use of its commerce clause power.2" This
expansion of the Commerce Clause has been troubling to some,
but is perhaps more reflective of the complex society in which we
live rather than an erosion of states' rights.224 Economic
change does not occur in a vacuum. The effects of this change
have a great impact on many aspects of people's lives. When
interstate commerce begins to "feel the pinch" of this change, "it
does not matter how local the operation which applies the
squeeze."22"
Though it may be correct that the effect that gun possession
in schools has on interstate commerce is not substantial, the
Court shied away from the battleground upon which Justice
Breyer sought to resolve the issue. Instead, the Court created a
novel distinction which, as Justice Breyer so aptly put it, "fails
to heed this Court's earlier warning not to turn 'questions of the
power of Congress' upon 'formula[s]' that would give 'controlling
force to nomenclature such as "production" and "indirect" and
foreclose consideration of the actual effects of the activity in
question upon interstate commerce.'"226
John W. Boyle
221. Id. at 1659. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 258-59; Hodel, 452
U.S. at 276.
222. Jones and Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 30. See also, e.g., Katzenbach, 379 U.S.
at 303.
223. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (invalidating
amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act which would have applied the wage
and hour provisions to state workers as exceeding the commerce clause power of
Congress).
224. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1643 (Thomas, J., concurring).
225. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 258 (quoting United States v. Women's
Sportswear Manufacturers Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949)).
226. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1663 (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at 120).
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